The forces were now below their paper strength and the men were badly fed and still worse equipped. The lack of efficient officers was particularly felt.[53]

It is one of the most serious condemnations of our war direction that we allowed such an army not merely to hold up superior numbers of our troops, but to inflict two serious defeats on them. There can be no doubt that a resolute and well-managed attack on the Turk in 1915 and certainly in 1916 would have crumpled him up and released the considerable forces locked in Egypt and Mesopotamia for a resolute attack on the Balkan Front. The saving in shipping alone would have made a substantial contribution to our resources. A Turkish overthrow in 1916 might have produced decisive results. In 1917 the consequence of such a victory, standing alone, would not have been as far reaching, unless followed by a defeat of the Bulgarian Army. But if a concentrated attack on Austria-Hungary were considered as a possible objective of the 1917 campaign, the prospect of a triumph *Unreliable* which would have a determining effect *Austrian troops on* the fate of the struggle seemed more promising. The German High Command at this date divided the Austrian troops into " reliable " and " unreliable," the latter being by far the more numerous. In the Brussiloff offensive of 1916, the Austrian Army put up no

serious fight.
Whole divisions surrendered without striking a blow.
The " prisoners" alone numbered over 300,000.
Hindenburg said it was not a surrender, but a
betrayal. The heart of the Slavs and Roumans
who constituted the majority of the Austrian
conscripts was not in the struggle. Nor were the